HERBICIDE USE IN
THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
AND USE IN
By
Kurt Priessman, MSgt, USAF (Ret)
B.A., M.B.A.
Submitted To
The
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword……………&#= 8230;…………………………= …………………………̷= 0;……… 3
Introduction…………̷= 0;…………………………= 230;…………………………&= #8230;…… 4
The Rules of Engagement and Operation Ranch Hand…………= 230;……………. 5
The
ROE Allows Expansion of Herbicide Use in
The
The Final Change to the Rules of Engagement……………&= #8230;…………………... 9
Herbicide
Tests in
Ranch
Hand Sorties Flown from
Air
Base Defense - Vegetation Control in
Air
Base Defense - Vegetation Control in
Flights
to and From
Other Documentation and the Conclusions Obtained…………̷= 0;………………... 19
Bibliography…………̷= 0;…………………………= 230;…………………………&= #8230;…….. 22
FOREWORD
This research paper was compiled during work on my claim to the Veterans Administration for Diabetes-Mellitus Type II, with peripheral neuropathy and nephropathy, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia, and polycythemia vera due to exposure to dioxins in herbicides, malathion, and petroleum distillates whi= le serving in Thailand, Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines and transiting Vietnam, Guam, Midway and Wake Island, and Hawaii. Additionally, I have had other dis= eases related directly to those with D-M such as Dupuytren’s contracture, Peyronies disease, and some Vitreo-retinal degeneration to name a few. I also have a damaged anterior cru= ciate and lateral collateral ligament with rotary instability of the right knee w= ith degenerative joint disease from a service-connected injury. The accident also caused a back in= jury, which has aggravated from lumbar spinal pain and back spasms over the years= , to degenerative joint disease and degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spin= e, and degenerative ankylosis of the left sacroiliac joint with mild osteoarthritis of both hips.
In
my effort to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that I flew through
The
conclusion at which I arrive is that Veterans of all wars who are still liv=
ing,
are at war with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the U.S.
Government. The government mu=
st
continue to deny and hide evidence that would show the world that those who=
ran
our government are not what the people of this country believe. To that end=
, I
have much of the evidence needed to prove that the
I also realized immediately that the information I was obtaining would help o= ther veterans and may be used to actually broaden the Agent Orange Act of 1991.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> I have not finished my research ye= t, it may take many years of effort. My hope is that it is sufficient for me to secure income sufficient to continu= e my research, to actually visit archives, and to continue to assist other Vietn= am-era Veterans.
“To me, there are three things we all shoul=
d do
every day. Number one is laugh. You should laugh every day. Number two is
think. You should spend some time in thought. Number three is, you should h=
ave
your emotions moved to tears, could be happiness or joy. But think about it=
. If
you laugh, you think, and you cry, that's a full day. That's a heck of a da=
y.
You do that seven days a week; you're going to have something special.
... Don't give up, don't ever give up. That's wha=
t I'm
going to try to do every minute that I have left. I will thank God for the =
day
and the moment I have. If you see me, smile and give me a hug. That's impor=
tant
to me too...
...But try if you can to support…so that so=
meone
else might survive, might prosper and might actually be cured...
...It cannot touch my mind, it cannot touch my he=
art
and it cannot touch my soul. And those three things are going to carry on
forever.
I thank you and God bless you all."
&nbs=
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nbsp; James
T.A. Valvano, 4 March 1993
THE CHRONOLOGY OF HERBICIDES IN
Thus b=
egan
the inception of Ranch Hand whose aircrews had already begun their journey =
to
INTRODUCTION
But every time the military wanted= to use herbicides for another reason, the rules were changed.
When it was in support of
&nb= sp; While many of us recognize that military commanders often tend to reinvent the wheel, it is especially when it is for their own egotistical a= nd personal purposes that mis-prioritization is most likely. When something is established organ= izationally, especially when it entails cross-organizational (military/political) purpos= es, the military leaves it alone.
These rules were documented in regulations such as MACV Directive 525-1, Military Operations, Herbicide Operations 3[KP3] and USMACTHAI/JUSMACTHAI Regulation 500-5, Arming of U.S. Military Perso= nnel and Rules of Engagement.
It became apparent that the rules f=
or
herbicide use, which were applied in
THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND OPERATION=
RANCH
HAND
Then there was a five month period= of inactivity due to the suspension of all herbicide missions by the Joint Chi= efs (JCS). The suspension required a review of the program at the “highest levels”. Before the rev= iew was completed, the suspension was ended when on May 7, 1963; the State Department issued new guidelines4[KP4] for both defoliation and crop destruction:
1. Authority to initiate defoliation operations is delegated to Ambassad= or and COMUSMACV.
2. Guidelines: Defoliation operations should be f= ew in number, undertaken only in following circumstances:
&= nbsp; a) where terrain and vegetation peculiarly favor use of herbicides;
&= nbsp; b) in areas remote from populati= on; and
&= nbsp; c) when hand cutting and burning= are impracticable. A few high pri= ority projects can be undertaken in populated areas where military advantage very clear and hand cutting and burning not feasible.
Crop Destruction:
1. All crop destruction operatio= ns must be approved in advance by Assistant Secretary FE and DOD.
2. Guidelines re Crop Destructio= n: a) Crop destruction must be confined to remote areas known to be occupied by VC. It should not be carried = on in areas where VC are intermingled with native inhabitants and latter cannot escape. Also should be limite= d to areas where VC either do not have nearby alternative sources food or areas = in which there is overall food deficit e.g. High Plateau and Zone D.
General Comments (applicable to both defoliation and crop destruction):
a.&n= bsp; All herbicide operations to be undertaken on= ly after it is clear both Psy-War preparations and compensation and relief machinery are adequate. Would appear GVN should increase compensation effor= ts.
b.&n= bsp; Suggest further increase reliance on hand operations where feasible which less awesome than spraying by air.
c.&n= bsp; Continue efforts counteract international ef= fect Commie propaganda through demonstrations, visits by newsman, etc.
d.&n= bsp; Request by first week in July a full report = and evaluation all 1963 herbicide operations to serve as basis decision whether continue defoliation and crop destruction.”
5[KP5] , was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Peter G. Olenchuck. The report concluded with eleven m= ajor recommendations.
“The first recommendation was=
for the
continuation of herbicide operations in
6<= /sup>[KP6] ; “In January 1964, authority was delegated to the senior U.S. Advisors serving with Vietnamese division for hand-spray operations. This greatly reduced log time that has existed from proposal to completion of small defoliation projects; i.e., around depots, airfields and outposts. Locations and types of herbicides unknown at this time.”
&=
nbsp;
The primary importance of the
Olenchuk Report; however, was that it pronounced defoliation and crop
destruction both technically and militarily effective and obtained the
endorsement of Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins for the continuation of=
the
program.”
THE ROE ALLOWS EXPANSION OF HERBICIDE=
USE
IN
For the
expansion, he also requested authority to change the May 1963 guidelines to
allow crop destruction operations in more populated and less remote areas o=
f
Saigon receiv= ed on August 7 continued the practice of requiring the U.S. Ambassador and a seni= or South Vietnamese official to approve, personally, each crop-destruction operation. The message extend= ed the range of possible targets to include less remote and more highly populated areas where the Viet Cong were experiencing significant food supply problem= s.”
“On May 7, 1966, Westmoreland=
asked
Ambassador Sullivan in
On August 27,
Admiral Sharp endorsed General Westmoreland’s proposal and on October=
4,
the Secretary of Defense wrote the Secretary of State to add his
endorsement. Over a month lat=
er, on
November 18, Secretary Rusk concurred.&nbs=
p;
The message to
to conduct selective
defoliation within the north-portion of the DMZ as well as adjacent
infiltration routes inside North Vietnam.&=
nbsp;
On June 12, the State Department granted the necessary approval
authority to the American Ambassador in
A committee consisting of senior
representatives from the Embassy, MACV, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) prepa=
red
a report for Bunker during the period March 1 - May 1, 1968. The committee consulted a wide ran=
ge of
documents and interviewed many American officials—military and
civilian—in
They also recommended greater efforts to provide Saigon officials with the necessary information = to manage and monitor the herbicide program effectively.24” Please note there is no conflict wi= th Alvin Young whose previous notes indicate permission for “hand-spraying operations” was give= n to senior U.S. Advisors with Vietn= amese divisions in January 1964.
Their report found, as had previous evaluations, that the herbicide program was successful from a military poin= t of view. The authors clearly recognized how herbicides had contributed to the policy of substituting rea= dily available firepower for manpower, a much more precious commodity to American political and military leaders. Ambassador Bunker formally approved the herbicide policy review repo= rt on August 28, 1964.7[KP7]
&nb= sp; In August 1968, MACV reported to CINCPAC that “…all field commanders, without exception, state that the herbicide operations had been extremely effective in assisting the Allied combat effort.” Two months later, the results of a= nother military evaluation ordered by MACV again supported the continuation of the herbicide program.8[KP8] In spite of these positive reports= , the future of herbicides was clouded by ecological questions, President Thieu’s attitude, and the fact that the disengagement of the United States from Southeast Asia was about to begin.28”
THE
&n=
bsp;
At the same time, the General Assembly passed another resolution ask=
ing
the Secretary General to prepare a report on chemical, biological, and
bacteriological weapons. The
General Assembly was consider-ing endorsing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a
treaty not ratified by the
They include the decision to condu= ct a study on U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents in the Secret National Security Study Memorandum 59 of May 28, 1969,9[KP9] which included a review of current applications of U.S. policy relating to non-lethal agents such as chemical riot control agents and chemical defolia= nts, the formation of the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) in the Top Secret/NODIS National Security Decision Memorandum 23 on September 16, = 1969,1= 0[KP10] the establishment of a the = United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program in the Top Secret/NODIS National Security Decision Memoran= dum 35 on November 25, 1969, the reiteration of the policy for approval of herbicide and riot-control agents based on the study required by NSSM 59, in the Secret National Security Decision Memorandum 78, Authorization for Use of Riot Control Agents and Chemical Herbicides in War on August 11, 1970.1= 1[KP11]
However, it was=
still
the position of the
While I have not ascertained what = was in those stockpiles or where they were, the paragraph “f.” specifi= cally mentions that Okinawa would require consultation (the prefecture was about = to be returned to Japan) and that if the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) wis= hed us to consult that could be accomplished.&= nbsp;
It is evident from the environmental studies conducted and the testi=
mony
provided that
The disclosure l= ed to immediate claims that New Zealand was in breach of the Geneva Convention and could face a flood of lawsuits from veterans and Vietnamese and of course Australia and New Zealand.
1= 2[KP12] .
I do= not believe that this information will be obtained through a Freedom of Informa= tion Act Inquiry, due mostly to the relationship between the discontinuance of t= he classification of relevant material to the international furor the release of this informa= tion would create.
On that day, the Deputy Secretary = of Defense informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of Defense w= ould temporarily suspend the use of 2, 4, 5-T in all military operations pending= a more thorough examination. Th= rough May 9, 1970, Ranch Hand crews drew down available supplies of agent white a= nd on that day flew the last defoliation (but not crop destruction) mission.
THE FINAL CHANGE TO THE RULES OF ENGA=
GEMENT
13[KP13] .
General Abrams stopped any further
procurement of white and blue herbicides. The herbicide stocks on hand in <=
st1:country-region
w:st=3D"on">
14[KP14] &= nbsp; with consideration of the Geneva Protocol. The results of the study were issu= ed in National Security Decision Memorandum 14115 [KP15] and changed slightly in National Security Decision Memorandum 15216[KP16] .
In April, General Abrams informed h= is forces that unless further authorization came in time, they were to stop all use of herbicides by May 1. T= he Joint Chiefs asked for continuing authority to spray base perimeters with h= erbicides blue and white. On April 28, Ambassador Bunker concurred with this request, noting that there was no satisfactory substitute for herbicides on base perimeters seeded with mines= and trip flares.”
The most difficult problem, as befo= re, was finding an alternative to herbicides for removing vegetation around min= es, booby traps, and barbed wire.”
<=
/span>He
acceded to the Defense Department’s request on the former and, withou=
t a
future expiration date, authorized American forces to spray herbicides from
ground equipment or helicopters, subject to controls applicable in the
This
is particularly important to
HERBICIDE TESTS IN
This neighboring Southeast As=
ian
country was suffering widespread and serious crop damage from locusts. One Ranch Hand aircraft and crew f=
lew to
17[KP17] which began in 1964 and stretched t= hrough 1965.
1= 8[KP18] and Vegetation Analysis of Pranburi Defoliation Test Area I, 66-077,1= 9[KP19] from the Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia.
These document both the 1964 and 1965 tests. While these tests were
conducted approximately 125 miles SSW of Bangkok, Thailand; the tests mark =
the beginning of herbicides in
Survey end preparations of two test= sites were initiated in August 1963. Lanes were cleared to mark boundaries of a series of 10 acre test plots for a tot= al of 1450 and 2000 acres of treatments at the two test site locations. Test site locations were establish= ed at the Pranburi Military Reservation with the assistance of MHDC officials. Arrangements were made with governmental authorities to use the facilities = of the Ministry of Communications Airport at Hua Hin as a base of operations f= or the twin engine Beechcraft used for test applications.”
The plane with full-time pilot and aircraft maintenance services was made available in late December 1963. An intensive s= eries of static flow tests and flight-calibrations was made from January to March 1964 to secure suitable boom configurations for deposit of various spray volumes and chemicals.”
23.”
Another important point should be made here. Barrels of herbicides (AO) were bu= ried under the runway at Bor Phai and not found until March, 1999.
There are speculations that during the
Vietnam War, the
It has long been thought that with=
the
denials of the
The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2, 4, 5-T and Dioxin, <= /i>by Alistair Hay, Plenum Publishing Corp, 233 Spring St., New York, N.Y., 1982, Professor Pfeiffer points to the publication of information contained in the twenty censored pages which even shows that Senator Church was still attemp= ting to deny the report through 197821[KP21] .
Moreover, th=
ere
are accounts that the forest area surrounding the airbase in the Southern T=
hai
This whole episode has reinforced fea= rs about the existence of buried Agent Orange and other toxic chemicals not on= ly in other spots inside Bor Phai airport, but in the other air bases in Thail= and as well that were utilized by the American military in it's war with Vietna= m.2= 2[KP22] ”
RANCH HAND SORTIES FLOWN FROM
23[KP23]
Some sorties on the northern secti=
ons of
the trail were flown out of American bases at Nakhon Phanom and
“November 1968 found the squ=
adron
involved in a highly classified mission into
For the next four days the spray p= lanes attacked various targets in the Laotian complex.” Although the crews questions the effectiveness of their mission to Laos, they enjoyed the almost stateside atmosphere of the base in Thailand; before leaving they threw a party in the officers’ club that left no doubt among the permanent party officers = that RANCH HAND had been there.”
Ranch Hand f=
lew
mission sorties against
The author in documenting the obsolesce=
nce of
the airframe notes a 1969 mission writes: “In addition to continuing
attacks throughout
“On 31 August RANCH HAND once mo=
re
deployed five UC-123Ks to Udorn Air Base,
Military personnel with any logistical= and operational experience would be immediately aware that the November 11, 196= 8, and the August 31, 1969, missions would require the pre-positioning of substan-tial supplies of the herbicides used on a multi-day, multi-sortie mission.